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ABSTRACT. Canada’s interest in the management of the waters of the arctic archipelago has generally been expressed in terms of sovereignty. This term 
covers a range of interests including security, environmental protection and the protection of the way  of life of northern communities, and resource 
exploitation. Three types of regimes can be proposed for the management of arctic marine transportation - a regime of free and open use  with control 
over shipping remaining with the flag state of each vessel; a regime of shared jurisdiction under which arctic coastal states would jointly manage 
transportation throughout arctic waters, including the Northwest Passage; and a regime of coastal state jurisdiction, under which each coastal state would 
be responsible for all transportation in its adjacent waters. Under this last regime Canada would assume control over all marine transportation in the 
Northwest Passage. While a free and open use regime would favour transit interests, it would not deal adequately with environmental protection, the 
protection of northern communities or resource exploitation interests. In these latter matters there is an imbalance between the interests of Canada and the 
interests of other states concerned predominantly with transit. Canada has therefore laid the basis for complete coastal state control over the waters of the 
arctic archipelago with the drawing of straight baselines around these waters. This does not exclude a cooperative management regime; rather, it 
establishes a particular basis on which such a regime would operate. Thus,  an effective management regime for marine transportation in the waters of the 
Canadian arctic archipelago will only be worked out once the question of jurisdiction over those waters is finally resolved. 
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RESUME. L’inttret que posskde le Canada dans la gestion des eaux de l’archipel Arctique s’est souvent exprimt en termes de souverainett.  Ce terme 
recouvre toute une gamme d’inttrets  y compris ceux rattachts 9 la stcuritt, a la protection de l’environnement et i la prtservation du mode de vie des 
communautts nordiques, ainsi qu’i I’exploitation des ressources. I1 y  a trois sortes de  rigimes  qui peuvent s’appliquer a la gestion du transport maritime 
dans l’ocban Arctique: un regime d’utilisation non restreinte oh le contr6le de la navigation appartiendrait au pays dont le vaisseau arbore le drapeau; un 
r6gime de juridiction partagte  en vertu duquel les Etats catiers  de 1’Arctique gkreraient en commun le transport dans les eaux arctiques, y compris le 
passage du Nord-Ouest; et un dgime  de juridiction des Etats catiers,  en vertu duquel chaque Etat bordt par l’octan Arctique aurait la responsabilite de 
tout le transport dans ses eaux limitrophes. En vertu de ce  demier  regime, le Canada aurait le contr6le de tout le transport maritime dans le passage du 
Nord-Ouest. Alors qu’un rtgime non restreint favoriserait les intkrkts des transporteurs, il ne tiendrait pas compte de fason adtquate des inttrets relics it 
la protection de I’environnement, a la prtservation  des  communautts du Nord et B l’exploitation des ressources. En  ce qui concerne ces inter&, il y  a un 
dtstquilibre entre ceux du Canada et ceux d’autres pays dont la prkoccupation principale est de faire transiter des marchandises dans ces eaux. Le Canada 
a donc jet6 les bases pour un contr6le absolu par chaque Etat c6tier sur les eaux de l’archipel Arctique, en trasant des lignes droites pour dtlimiter les 
zones. Cela n’exclut pas un rtgime de gestion cooptrative, mais dtfinit plutat les principes particuliers selon lesquels un tel rkgime fonctionnerait. C‘est 
ainsi qu’un rkgime de gestion efficace du transport maritime dans les eaux de l’archipel Arctique canadien ne pourra &tre mis en place que lorsqu’on aura 
enfin trouvt une solution au probltme de la juridiction sur ces eaux. 
Mots clbs: archipel Arctique, souveraineti, relations entre le Canada et les Etats-Unis, protection de l’environnement, sbcuriti, gestion, juridiction, 
passage du Nord-Ouest 
Traduit pour le journal par Ntsida Loyer 
INTRODUCTION 
This perspective  on the issues  raised  by arctic marine transporta- 
tion  was  prepared to provide a basis for discussion for the Arctic 
Policy Forum, rather  than to provide a  comprehensive account 
of arctic characteristics or to offer a detailed analysis of the 
problems. In order to establish a  context for a  consideration of 
approaches to resolving the complex and contentious issues 
arising  out of marine  transportation  in arctic waters, it is 
necessary to outline  Canadian interests and concerns in these 
waters generally. In the light of this background, alternative 
regimes for managing transportation in arctic waters  will  be set 
out, and their suitability for dealing with  the fundamental issues 
will  be considered. 
The problems of transportation  in  Canadian  and U.S. arctic 
waters arise in two quite distinct areas. First, there are the 
relatively open  areas  of the Arctic  Ocean  and  the  Beaufort Sea in 
the  west  and  Baffin  Bay  and  Davis Strait in the east.  Secondly, 
there are the more enclosed waters of the Canadian arctic 
archipelago, in  which the Northwest  Passage is located. It is the 
special characteristics of the Canadian arctic archipelago and 
the sedice areas  between  its  islands  that lie at the root  of the 
problem  of  the  management  of arctic marine transportation. If 
the Canadian arctic archipelago did  not exist, both Canada and 
the United States would  have similar jurisdictional regimes off 
their mainland coasts, and thus each would share a common 
problem applicable to its own separate area of jurisdiction. 
Canada would have marine transportation interests in arctic 
waters adjacent to the U.S. coasts and the U.S. would have 
marine  transportation  interests  in  waters adjacent to Canadian 
coasts. There would  be a common  interest  in  reconciling  marine 
transportation  issues  with other issues  in areas that  would  be 
geographically and  environmentally similar. The  existence of 
the Canadian  arctic archipelago, however, makes  the situation 
much  more complex. 
CANADIAN ARCTIC ISSUES AND CONCERNS 
Canadian arctic aspirations  have traditionally been expressed 
symbolically  in  terms  of sovereignty. This was the purport of 
Senator Poirier’s famous  resolution  in 1907, designed to 
confirm Canadian sovereignty over the “lands and islands 
situated  in the north of the Dominion, and extending to the  north 
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pole.”  This statement  is  often  taken  as  the  origin  of the sector 
theory, according to which  the  authority of arctic littoral states 
extends from their coasts to the North Pole. This desire for 
“sovereignty” was a remnant of the 19th-century desire to 
aggrandize  territory  and  was  based in part  on a need to ensure  a 
defined and secure northern border. But, as the claim to the 
islands of the  Arctic  achieved general  recognition and  accep- 
tance, attention  focused  on  the  waters  between the islands of the 
arctic archipelago. This brought a much greater awareness of 
the interrelationship between the waters  and the land. Authority 
over the  land  dictated a predominant  interest  in the water  and ice 
that adjoined the land. In other  words, quite apart from 
19th-century concepts of sovereignty  and security, the littoral 
state in  the  Arctic  was  perceived  by  Canada  at least to have  an 
interest  in the sedice that  abutted  the land. This relationship of 
arctic waters  and arctic ice  to the land appeared quite different 
from  the relationship between land and sea that  was the founda- 
tion of the traditional  concept  of  authority over  maritime areas 
- the  17th-century  theory of free and  open use of the seas. 
It is important, therefore, when considering  Canadian 
approaches to, or perspectives on, arctic marine transportation 
not  to  view the question  simply  in traditional terms - as a  claim 
to  property or dominion  over  the seas. The  Canadian position on 
the status of arctic waters  and the control of transit through them 
cannot  be  assessed as if it were no more  than a  claim to territorial 
sovereignty over  an expanse of water. Canada’s approach rests 
upon a perception  of the unique  nature  of the area and the special 
needs to which  that  uniqueness gives rise, as well  as  an 
historical view  of Canadian interests in the area. 
The  range of Canadian interests and concerns in respect of 
arctic waters can be divided into three categories: (a) issues 
relating to sovereignty, jurisdiction and security; (b) issues 
relating to environmental protection  and  the protection of north- 
ern  communities; (c) issues relating to resource exploitation. 
Sovereignty, Jurisdiction  and  Security 
The view  that  Canada has, or ought to have,  sovereignty  over 
the waters  of  the  Canadian arctic archipelago, as well as over the 
islands, has  received  frequent affirmation by Canadian political 
leaders, although not always without ambiguity. The waters 
have  been  variously  described as part of “national terrain,” as 
“internal waters,” and as “Canadian  waters.”  This desire for 
authority over northern  waters accords to some extent with a 
Canadian self-image expressed by Prime  Minister  Diefenbaker 
in 1958 (“A Canada  of the North . . . A new  Vision! A new 
Hope!  A soul for Canada,” in Reid, 1974). But it would be a 
mistake  to  dismiss  Canadian interests in sovereignty  over arctic 
waters as notions  grounded  solely  in  an emotional view  of the 
North. The continued emphasis upon “sovereignty” masks 
particular vital interests involved. The claim to sovereignty 
today rests upon a perceived  need to administer the area in a way 
to protect particular Canadian interests, including the interests 
of the inhabitants of arctic areas and their environment, and to 
provide for the rational use of living and  non-living resources of 
the waters  of the Canadian Arctic. 
Thus, the desire for jurisdiction over the waters of the 
Canadian arctic archipelago, of  which the claim to sovereignty 
over the waters is a  general expression, results from the percep- 
tion  that  the  use  of these waters  will have to be regulated  because 
the consequences of their use  will inevitably extend to the land 
masses  and  peoples  of Canada. It is Canadian  land that is most 
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proximate  to  the  waters of the arctic archipelago; it is Canadian 
people  who  use  these  waters  and  who  often depend  on them for 
their livelihood; and therefore, it  is the land  and  its inhabitants 
that  will  bear  the  brunt of any  harmful activities. 
From a Canadian perspective, the legal regime that applies to 
the  high seas does not  provide appropriate guidance for manage- 
ment of the waters of the Canadian arctic archipelago. The 
consequences of any  undertaking on the high seas are poten- 
tially shared by the community as a whole. Not so with the 
waters  of the Canadian Arctic. The parallel with major interna- 
tional straits is also inadequate. Generally  vessels remain within 
such straits only for relatively short  periods  of time, the hazards 
of  navigating  most international straits compare in  no  way  with 
the hazards of navigating the waters of the Canadian arctic 
archipelago and the consequences of  navigation do not  usually 
extend  only  to a single state. In other words, the unique 
characteristics of  the  waters  of the Canadian arctic archipelago 
make, in  the  Canadian view, the exercise of  Canadian jurisdic- 
tion over them a matter of necessity. The most comprehensive 
basis for the exercise of such jurisdiction rests in a  claim to 
sovereignty. 
The question of security, although an ever-present factor in 
19th-century  claims to territorial sovereignty, has never been 
the dominant factor in  Canadian claims to authority over arctic 
waters. There are several reasons for this. First, Canadian 
defence strategy in colonial times was focused in the east. 
Secondly, the nature  of the area itself  provided  its  own security; 
it was  in a  sense not capable of  being defended,  but by the same 
token it was  not an area from which an attack could be  readily 
mounted. Thirdly, when the issue  of security in the North  did 
become a  major concern it was  perceived  as a need  to counteract 
a buildup  in the U.S. presence  in the Canadian  Arctic that  had 
grown during the Second World  War (Granatstein, 1976). 
The Distant Early Waming (DEW) line controversy con- 
cerned Canadian  sovereignty  vis-&vis the United States over 
northern lands, not the water. But the threat from the Soviet 
Union  was  perceived as a problem  shared  with  the  United States 
(or with the Western alliance) to  be resolved through coopera- 
tive means.  The interests  of  both  Canada  and  the U.S. were  best 
protected  by  such cooperation, and claims to sovereignty or  to 
exercise sole jurisdiction over arctic waters for security pur- 
poses would  have  served  no  useful purpose for Canada (Suther- 
land, 1966; Gellner, 1976;  Hockin  and Brennan, 1976). How- 
ever, it was a security-related issue - the voyage  of the U. S . S . 
Nautilus under the polar ice cap in 1958 - that brought the 
question of jurisdiction over the waters to the fore, and the status 
of the waters of the Canadian arctic archipelago has been a 
recurrent issue in Canada4J.S. relations ever since. Equally, it 
was a security-related issue - the  voyage  of the Polar Sea in 
1985 - that  led to Canada’s taking  of a further step in its claim 
to the waters of the Canadian arctic archipelago with the 
drawing of straight baselines (Territorial Sea Geographical 
Co-ordinates  (Area 7) Order, 1985). 
Notwithstanding Canada’s longstanding position on sover- 
eignty over arctic waters, the claim had  not  until recently been 
embodied in any formal legislation. Legislation applicable to 
arctic management dealt with particular functional assertions of 
jurisdiction - the Canada Shipping Act, the Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act and the Canada Oil and Gas Act. 
Although  Canada  had  established a 12-mile territorial sea,  no 
basepoints had  been designated to show  how this was specifi- 
cally applicable to arctic waters. On 1 January  1986,  however, 
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Canada  closed  any  gaps  that  might  previously  have  existed  by 
promulgating straight baselines around the Canadian arctic 
archipelago and enclosing the waters within as the internal 
waters of Canada. 
Environmental Protection and the Protection of Northern Com- 
munities 
Canadian  concerns  about  the  environmental  consequences  of 
the use of the waters of the Canadian archipelago achieved 
considerable public prominence following the voyage of the 
Manhattan in 1969. Couching  the  problem  posed  by  the Man- 
hattan passage specifically in environmental terms seemed a 
logical  approach.  There  was  at  that  time a developing  awareness 
worldwide of the deterioration of the human environment, 
particularly  in  relation  to  the oceans, and Sweden had  already 
taken  the  initiative  of  placing  the  protection of the environment 
on  the  agenda of the  United  Nations  General  Assembly. This led 
ultimately  to  the  Stockholm  Conference  in 1970. 
One can, of course, debate  whether  Canada’s  environmental 
concerns  in  respect  of the Arctic  were  developed  as  an  alterna- 
tive,  less  contentious,  way of reinforcing  Canadian sovereignty, 
or whether they were based on considered research into the 
environmental  consequences  of  passage  through  arctic  waters 
(Dosman, 1976; McConchie andReid, 1977). Nevertheless, the 
approach  struck a chord  with  the  Canadian public, and  this  is 
reflected  in  the  unanimous  adoption  of  the  Arctic  Waters 
Pollution  Prevention  Act  by the House of Commons, the devel- 
opment  within  Canada  of a formal  environmental  review  pro- 
cess for (inter  alia) activities that affect northern waters, the 
development of public  interest  watchdogs for northern  land  and 
sea areas (pre-eminent among which is the Canadian Arctic 
Resources  Committee,  CARC)  and a burgeoning  of  research  in 
both  the  physical  and  social  sciences  relating  to the use  of  arctic 
lands, waters and their resources and consequential environ- 
mental impacts. Whether concern for the arctic environment 
was a product of the Manhattan voyage or whether it has  earlier 
antecedents, it is certainly  now  firmly  entrenched  in  the  Cana- 
dian  view  of  the  Arctic. 
It is, however,  misleading  to  interpret  the  Canadian  concern 
for the protection of the arctic marine environment and the 
strength of the reaction  that  followed the Manhattan voyage  as a 
desire  to  exclude  shipping  from  arctic  waters -to close off  the 
Northwest  Passage  to  foreign shipping, if not  to  all shipping. In 
1970  Canada  saw  its  interests  as  being  served  by  the  opening  up 
of the Northwest  Passage  to  shipping o less  than the interests  of 
the  United  States  and other states  would  be  served. The Cana- 
dian  government  at  the  time  of  the  enactment of the  arctic  waters 
legislation  stated  that  it  was  “determined to open up the 
Northwest  Passage  to  safe navigation,” and the Arctic  Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act provides for navigation of arctic 
waters, while establishing the conditions under which such 
navigation  will  take  place. The submission of the Arctic  Pilot 
Project to an  Environmental  Assessment  Panel  under the federal 
Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) in 
1973 was  designed  to  determine the consequences  of the pro- 
posal for the  transport  of  liquefied  natural gas (LNG)  through 
arctic  waters  and to determine  the  special  measures  needed if the 
proposal  proved  feasible - it  was  not a rejection  of the proposal 
in limine. Since 1970, however, serious  questions  have  arisen  in 
Canada about the consequences of opening the Northwest 
Passage to international  maritime  traffic. 
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Nevertheless, the approval by Canada of the pioneering 
tourist  cruise  of  the Lindblad Explorer in  the summer of 1984, 
and  the  cooperation  extended  to  that  voyage,  is a further 
indication  that  the  question  is  not  whether  marine  transportation 
can be undertaken, but rather under what conditions such 
transportation  is  to  take  place. Some form  of  marine  transporta- 
tion  in  arctic  waters  is  an  inevitability;  the  problem  is  to  find a 
way  both  to  satisfy  transportation  needs  and  to  ensure  adequate 
protection of the  arctic  marine  and  land environments. 
An  aspect of environmental  protection  in  arctic areas that  has 
assumed a greater  prominence  over  time is the  preservation of 
the economic base, the way of life and the habitat of the 
indigenous  people of the  North.  This  has  resulted from the  rising 
political  demands of the  Inuit  and  the  assertion f rights  to land, 
waters and sea ice areas. Studies of the historical use by 
indigenous  communities of the  waters  and  sea  ice  (Vanderzwaag 
and  Pharand,  1983)  show a picture  of  use  patterns over exten- 
sive areas of the arctic  archipelago  over  the centuries. In 
particular, the Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project has 
demonstrated  that “the Inuit  have  hunted  and  trapped over a 
vast  majority of the  Northwest Passage.” Dependence  upon  the 
area is both economic and cultural. Thus, the fact of marine 
transportation  through  arctic  waters  will  have a direct  impact  on 
the lives of the  inhabitants of the  Arctic  irrespective  of  whether 
marine  casualties  involving  the  release  of  harmful  substances 
into  the  environment occur. 
The importance of Inuit  concerns  to  problems of arctic  marine 
transportation  has  been  characterized by the  emerging  political 
power  and  political  institutions of the  inhabitants  of  the North. 
Thus, Inuit  opposition,  including  that  of  the  Inuit  Circumpolar 
Conference, which includes U.S. and Greenland as well as 
Canadian  Inuit  representation,  was  instrumental  in  effectively 
blocking  the  Arctic  Pilot  Project. This emergence  of  political 
power is reflected  also  in  the  process  of  devolution  of  authority 
from the federal government in Ottawa to institutions of the 
people of the North. This may lead to the formation of new 
territorial units, perhaps  with  provincial status. Although  any 
constitutional change is unlikely to legally impair traditional 
federal  responsibilities  in the transportation,  fisheries  and  energy 
fields, the processes of consultation that exist can only be 
intensified. The settlement of land claims and  the  continuing 
demand for direct involvement by formal institutions or less 
formal  pressure  groups  in  decision  making  will  have  important 
implications for the  future of arctic  marine  transportation. 
In the last 15 years knowledge of the nature of the arctic 
environment, the  characteristics of the  arctic  ecosystem  and  the 
people who live  there  has  increased. This knowledge  contrib- 
utes to a better understanding of the implications of arctic 
marine transportation, but at the same time it reinforces the 
Canadian  view  that  Canada  must  have jurisdiction over arctic 
marine areas in  order  to  ensure  proper management, including 
the authority  to  manage  the  emerging  need for marine  transpor- 
tation. From a Canadian perspective, subsequent knowledge 
has  confirmed  that  the  assertion  of  environmental jurisdiction in 
the Arctic  Waters  Pollution  Prevention  Act  was essential, and 
subsequent  reviews of that  legislation  have  been  concerned  with 
an  updating of technical  standards. There has  been  no  reconsid- 
eration of its basic  thrust. 
Since the  1970  legislation,  which  established apollution zone 
100 miles offshore, the  Canada  Shipping  Act  has  been  extended 
to apply  up to 200 miles  off the Canadian coast. Thus, north of 
60” the Arctic  Waters  Pollution  Prevention  Act  applies up to 100 
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miles  from  the  coast  and  the  pollution  prevention  provisions of 
the Canada Shipping Act apply between 100 and 200 miles 
offshore. 
The outcry  that  followed  the  voyage  of  the Polar Sea in 1985, 
however, showed  that compliance in fact with environmental 
standards was  not  enough to satisfy the Canadian public. This 
led  to  the  adoption  on 1 January 1986 of the straight baseline 
method  of  measuring  the starting point  of  the territorial sea. This 
was  in effect a confirmation of Canada’s  claim that the waters  of 
the arctic archipelago  are  the internal waters  of Canada. 
Resource Exploitation Interests 
Canadian  interests in the  resources  of arctic waters  and the 
seabed predate the growth in environmental awareness. The 
Inuit  interest in the  living  resources of the Arctic goes back  to 
antiquity  and  continues today. “Interest,” in fact, understates 
the condition - it is a relationship of economic, cultural and 
nutritional dependence.  Canada’s more general interest in the 
management of the living resources  of arctic waters  was  mani- 
fested  by the application  of  the  Canadian 200-mile fishing zone 
to arctic waters  by order-in-council in 1978. 
However, the  discovery of oil  at  Prudhoe  Bay  by Atlantic 
Richfield in 1968  changed  the dimension of resource interests in 
the Arctic. First, it  served notice of the resource potential of 
northern  areas  (confirmed for Canada  by later Dome  Petroleum 
discoveries in  the  Beaufort Sea), and  in  the light of the 1973 oil 
crisis this  potential  loomed larger in  Canada’s resource calcula- 
tions. Secondly, the discoveries, closely followed by the Man- 
hattan test run, focused attention on the importance of the 
waters  of the Northwest  Passage as a  maritime transportation 
route. Subsequent natural gas discoveries in the High Arctic 
focused attention again on the importance of arctic marine 
transportation. Since then, the Arctic Pilot Project for the 
transportation of LNG  through arctic waters  and  Pan  Arctic’s 
“Bent  Horn” proposal  have required that the issues of arctic 
marine  transportation  be  confronted directly. 
The pressure  to  respond  to proposals for resource extraction 
and removal in the Arctic brings to the fore the inevitable 
conflict, seen  graphically  in  both Canada and the United States, 
between resource utilization and environmental controls and 
highlights the complexity  of Canada’s  own arctic interests. The 
question is not whether environmental interests will win out 
over resource use or marine transportation interests in arctic 
waters, but rather under  which legal regime  such activities will 
take place  and  according to what standards. 
ALTERNATIVE REGIME MODELS: CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES 
Although  one can  conceive of a variety of different regimes 
for the management  of arctic marine transportation, there are 
three basic models, of  which others simply constitute variants. 
For the purposes  of  this  paper it will  be convenient to treat each 
model separately, in each case indicating to what extent it 
accords with Canadian interests and approaches. The three 
regimes can be characterized as (1) free and open use - 
international management, (2) shared jurisdiction - coopera- 
tive  management  and (3) unilateral coastal state jurisdiction and 
management.  Each  model deals with a particular approach to 
both jurisdiction over the  waters  and  management of marine 
transportation, because  every management regime  presupposes 
a particular jurisdictional status in the waters. 
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Free and Open  Use - International Management 
Under  this  approach the waters  of the Arctic  would  be  treated 
in a manner similar to the high seas. Each state would  be free to 
use  those  waters  according  to  its  own needs, and shipping would 
be subject only to the jurisdiction of the flag state. No state 
would exercise sovereignty or jurisdiction over the waters. 
Standards imposed  on  users  of  those  waters  would have to  be 
established in  the  traditional  way - through  customary devel- 
opment  or  through  multilateral treaty. Standards established by 
treaty  could not, of course, be  applied against non-participating 
third states. 
Such an approach poses immediate difficulties for arctic 
waters. Even in the absence of particular claims to historic 
waters or of the construction of baselines in the light of the 
particular geographic characteristics of the area, bands of coastal 
state jurisdiction would  normally radiate from the islands of the 
Canadian arctic archipelago. These would include a 12-mile 
territorial sea and a 200-mile fishing zone or exclusive eco- 
nomic zone.  A 12-mile  territorial sea measured  from low-water 
mark  (again  disregarding  the particular geographic characteris- 
tics  of the area) would result in the enclosure of  Barrow Strait as 
well as Prince of Wales Strait (the so called “gateways”) 
(Pharand, 1973) within the territorial seas of Canada. The 
Northwest Passage would, therefore, go through part of the 
territorial waters of Canada, and thus the “free and open” 
regime  would  not  apply  throughout  its full extent. Even if an 
international straits regime were established, passage would  not 
be  entirely “free and open.” 
Moreover, even  in the other waters  of the Passage a free and 
open regime could not be applied without qualification. The 
whole of the area is within 200 miles  of  Canadian coasts and 
would thus fall within  any  Canadian exclusive  economic  zone. 
This means  that fisheries, continental shelf  and  marine scientific 
research  would  all  be  within the jurisdiction of Canada, and  as 
the coastal state Canada  would  have certain rights in respect of 
the  prevention of marine  pollution  and  would  to a limited extent 
have  some  controls  over shipping. 
Objections such as these are often  perceived  as legalistic. But 
the rules relating to the territorial sea and the exclusive  eco- 
nomic zone (EEZ) rests upon a recognition of the primary 
interest of the coastal state in activities off its coasts. That 
primary interest is a consequence of the political and economic 
relationship of the land to the adjacent marine areas. The 
foundation  of  the doctrine of the territorial sea lies in the security 
needs  of the coastal state, and the foundations of the continental 
shelf and the exclusive economic zone lie in the economic 
interests and  needs  of the coastal state. Thus the adoption of a 
complete free and  open use  regime for arctic waters  would  be 
contrary to the contemporary  trend in the law  of the sea  and, in 
fact, it would  be  inconsistent  with the actual practices of  both 
Canada  and the U.S. It would  correspond  to neither jurisdic- 
tional nor  management  needs in respect of arctic waters. 
Shared Jurisdiction - Cooperative Management 
This approach  would involve  submitting arctic waters to a 
regime established by the arctic coastal states themselves - 
either bilaterally, involving  Canada  and the United States alone, 
or regionally, involving all the arctic coastal states. The  idea 
that the arctic littoral states should assert joint jurisdiction over 
arctic waters  and assume joint responsibility for the manage- 
ment of them is similar to the claims made  by states surrounding 
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enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Article 123 of the 1982 Law of 
the  Sea  Convention  provides  that states bordering  enclosed or 
semi-enclosed  seas  should cooperate, specifically: 
(i) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration 
and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; 
(ii) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties 
with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment; 
(iii) to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and under- 
take where appropriate programmes of scientific research in the 
area. 
The  treatment of the  Arctic  Ocean  as a whole as an  enclosed or 
semi-enclosed sea would be an expansive application of the 
concept of enclosure, and it is  difficult to see  that a  reasonable 
construction  of  the  words “enclosed  or  semi-enclosed” would 
admit of such a characterization. Nevertheless, the principle 
underlying  the  rules  relating  to  enclosed or  semi-enclosed seas 
- that  it  is the littoral  states  who  are  primarily affected by the 
use of those seas, and  thus  they  should  have  the principle, if not 
exclusive, responsibility for management  and control - does 
provide some analogy for approaches to the management of 
arctic  waters  and  in particular the  management  of arctic marine 
transportation. 
There are a variety of models throughout the world  of 
regional management regimes, such as international fisheries 
commissions (Koers, 1973), and regional bodies concerned 
with  marine pollution. The  common features of these institu- 
tions is that their member states collaborate to establish the 
scientific  basis  on  which  decisions  about  resource  utilization r 
the control of certain kinds of uses are made.  Then,  on the basis 
of common discussions, decisions are made  through a  consen- 
sus or majority decision-making procedure. These decisions 
may  be  in  the  form  of  recommendations  to  member states or, as 
in the case of some fisheries commissions, the decision may 
constitute an  agreed  allocation  of  the catch  binding upon the 
member state. 
The paradigm for bilateral cooperative arrangements  between 
Canada  and  the  United States is the International Joint Commis- 
sion (IJC). Since its establishment under the Boundary Waters 
Treaty of 1909, the  commission  has  been  involved  in investigat- 
ing the effects of activities on boundary waters, regulating 
certain uses  of  those  waters  and  reporting  to the two govern- 
ments on specific matters  referred to it. Although it has dispute 
settlement responsibilities under  its constitution, no request  has 
ever been made for the IJC to exercise arbitral or judicial 
functions. The ability of the IJC to function effectively is 
constrained  by  the  support  that the national governments of the 
time are prepared to provide; nevertheless, it  has established a 
record  of  independence  and  impartiality  that offers a model for 
bilateral management in other areas (Bloomfield and Fitzgerald, 
1958). 
How appropriate, then, are institutions such as the IJC for the 
management of arctic  marine transportation? Seen  from a 
Canadian perspective, there are several difficulties. First, the 
chances of establishing a regional management regime that 
would  include  the  Soviet  Union appear  remote. It  would entail a 
renunciation by the Soviet  Union  of  its  position on the status of 
the  waters  of the eastern Arctic and a willingness to submit  those 
waters to joint management. Bilateral Canada-U.S. manage- 
ment (perhaps involving Denmark as well) might, therefore, 
provide the only possibility for shared management.  Secondly, 
a precondition for an effective cooperative management regime 
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is a comparability of interest in the participating states. Existing 
regimes are of  two types. First, the  participating states may  be 
dealing with  an  area or resource  over  which  no state exercises 
jurisdiction, but in which all of the states have a common 
interest. This  is so of the  international fisheries commissions, 
which  have  historically operated in areas  beyond  national juris- 
diction. Secondly, the  participating  states  may  be  involved in 
the  regulation of matters  within  the  national jurisdiction of each 
because  they  have  recognized  that  they  have a common  problem 
that  should  be  dealt  with  through  cooperation  with  neighbouring 
states. This  applies to the IJC and  bodies  such  as  the  Tnterna- 
tional  Commission for the Rhine. 
But  the  position in respect of the  waters  of  the  Canadian arctic 
archipelago is different. Putting aside the question of any 
Canadian claim to  treat  these  waters  as internal, the  waters  could 
not  be  regarded just (if  at all) as  high seas. The waters of the 
Northwest  Passage  are  at  the  very least within  the domains of  the 
exclusive economic  zone  of Canada.  Thus, at  the outset there is 
an imbalance of interest between Canada and other states in 
those waters. The  interest  of other states is primarily in the  use 
of the  waters  for transit. Canada  is certainly interested in transit 
uses, but it is also interested in the living resources of those 
waters, in  the  resources of the  seabed  and  in  the protection of  the 
surrounding  marine  and  land environments.  There is not, there- 
fore, the  equality of interest  in a common  resource  that exists in 
the case of international fisheries commissions. 
The IJC also operates  in a specific jurisdictional context. It 
deals with  problems  common to Canada  and  the  United States, 
the solutions to which are applied by each state in areas of 
recognized separate jurisdiction. Each state retains its territorial 
jurisdiction over its  boundary  waters  and  applies the results of 
the work of the  IJC  through  its  own domestic law. 
The problem  cannot be avoided  by establishing a joint man- 
agement  regime  unless  the  question  of jurisdiction is resolved. 
A joint management  regime  over  an  area  in  which  the jurisdic- 
tion of no single state is acknowledged  implies  that it is an area 
ofjoint jurisdiction (otherwise regulations  could  not  be  enforced 
against  third states). Thus,  a joint management  regime  between 
Canada  and  the U.S. in respect of arctic waters, or in particular 
in respect of the waters of the Northwest Passage, would (unless 
applied  only to the flag  vessels  of  the  two states) constitute, in 
effect, a joint claim to jurisdiction over those waters. Thus, 
from a Canadian perspective a joint or shared management 
system  without  an  acknowledgement  of  Canadian jurisdiction 
over the  waters  of  the  Northwest Passage would constitute a 
renunciation of Canadian claims in favour of a joint regime of 
jurisdiction in an area where Canadian interests are greater, 
more  varied  and  have a stronger claim for recognition under 
international law.  The legal basis for a regime of joint jurisdic- 
tion, whether  claimed expressly or arising as a result of a  claim 
to joint management  of the area, would  rest on the same basis as 
the Canadian  claim  to sole jurisdiction over  the area. In these 
circumstances it is difficult to see why it would be in the 
Canadian interest to  agree  to a  cooperative management regime 
that  carried  with it a  regime of joint jurisdiction. 
Unilateral Coastal State Jurisdiction and Management 
This approach is embodied in the sector theory; each arctic 
sector state is entitled to jurisdiction over, and therefore to 
manage on its own, the waters  that extend  from its coasts to the 
North Pole. Each arctic sector would  be subject to the exclusive 
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jurisdiction of  an individual state, and thus all the waters of the 
Arctic would be “internal waters.” However, it would be 
difficult  to justify in  law  the nclosure of the whole  of the Arctic 
Ocean  in  this  way,  even if all of the arctic states  were  to agree to 
treat  the  area  as  an  enclosed sea. On  the other hand, a basis for 
treating  some of the arctic waters  as internal waters  can  be found 
where  the  circumstances are such  that  an historic title can be 
maintained or where  the  use of straight baselines for the mea- 
surement of the  territorial  sea  is permitted. Although the sector 
theory  is often still  associated  with  Canadian sovereignty  claims 
in the North, in fact those claims find a better basis in the 
geographical  nature of the  arctic archipelago in  the interrelation- 
ship of land  and  water  that s retches from continental Canada to 
the  North  Pole  and in historical factors. 
Obviously, unilateral coastal state jurisdiction and  manage- 
ment  has  many  attractions for Canada, for it  would ensure that 
the  management  of  arctic  waters  and of transportation through 
those  waters  was  retained in Canadian  hands. Accordingly, it 
would ensure that  Canadian interests and concerns were  taken 
fully  into  account  in the design of any  regime  to  manage arctic 
marine transportation. 
Such an  approach  may offer less to  the  United States within 
its  own  zone  because of the relatively open nature  of the arctic 
waters  off  Alaska  and the lack  of islands extending from the 
coast northward. The existing regime of the law of the sea 
governing  maritime  transit (as set out in  the 1982  Convention  on 
the  Law of the Sea) would  be applicable to the areas of territorial 
sea, exclusive economic  zone  and  high seas respectively (sub- 
ject to the applicability of Article  234 of the Convention, which 
will  be  discussed below). 
Notwithstanding the apparent advantages of a model of 
unilateral coastal state jurisdiction and management,  a manage- 
ment regime cannot operate in  complete isolation. Ships other 
than  those  flying  the  flag of the coastal state will  wish to transit 
arctic waters, and  thus their interests  will  have to be considered. 
Moreover, there  are  immense practical disadvantages in estab- 
lishing shipping standards substantially different from those 
established by other arctic littoral states. In other words, there 
would  have to be cooperation  between arctic littoral states on the 
formulation  of  standards  even if ultimately the adoption of  those 
standards  and  their  application falls to each state within  its own 
waters. Cooperation  is essential, too, with  major transit users of 
the waters. In practice, therefore, a  regime of unilateral coastal 
state jurisdiction might  be  combined  with a  cooperative man- 
agement regime.  The locus  of  ultimate  authority to legislate and 
to enforce would  remain  with the state that has jurisdiction, but 
the nature  of  the  management regime would depend upon the 
modalities of cooperation worked out in each case. 
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES: APPROPRIATE  REGIMES 
The  above discussion  has dealt with  management regimes in 
general terms. The  question now  becomes whether the particu- 
lar interests involved  in arctic marine transportation require one 
type  of regime rather  than another. 
Security Issues 
The  question of  security is in certain respects distinct from the 
problems associated with the development of a  regime for arctic 
marine transportation. Moreover, it is  a  matter  on which 
Canada-U. S. cooperation is long-standing. Mechanisms for 
cooperation between Canada and the U.S. on defence are 
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well established, and  problems associated with  the  use  of arctic 
waters  by  military  vessels  might  be  best dealt with  within  those 
mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, some of the problems to which  military  uses 
give rise are similar to the problems  raised  by potential commer- 
cial navigation in arctic waters, such as the submerged or 
non-submerged transit of submarines  and the passage  of nuclear- 
powered vessels. Thus, although  there are some matters that can 
be  resolved in the  light  of  the exigencies  of-defence  considera- 
tions in arctic waters, there  are others whose solution must  be  in 
conformity  with  any  regime for commercial  marine transporta- 
tion. Passage  by U.S. naval  vessels  through Canadian internal 
waters has been accommodated from time to time through 
Canada-U.S.  cooperation, and  thus  many defence needs can be 
worked  out  through  traditional cooperative  channels between 
Canada  and the U.S. On  this issue, however, the U.S. position 
in  1985  at the time of the voyage of the Polar Sea appeared to be 
quite ambiguous, yet it is a matter on which the United States 
has a particular interest in ensuring Canadian cooperation. 
Resource  Exploitation 
The management of resource exploitation in arctic waters 
(including the seabed) is not directly in issue when considering 
the development of a regime for marine arctic transportation. 
On the basis  of  the 1982 Convention on the Law  of the Sea the 
jurisdictional regime for resource  exploration and exploitation 
is relatively clear - a 200-mile exclusive  economic  zone and 
sovereign rights  over  the r sources of the continental shelf out to 
the outer edge of  the continental margin. Problems exist in the 
delimitation of  the  maritime  boundary in the Beaufort Sea, both 
for fisheries and continental shelf purposes, and the precise 
location of the outer  limit  of the continental shelf  has  yet to be 
determined (including the question of the status of the Alpha 
Ridge). Resource exploitation issues do not  of themselves pose 
problems of joint management, apart from the question of 
transboundary fishery stocks or transboundary  hydrocarbon or 
other  mineral deposits. 
There are several matters, nevertheless, on which interests 
are common  and cooperation seems logical. First, there is the 
need for resource-related scientific investigations of arctic waters 
and ice areas. Mechanisms  already existing for the approval of 
scientific research  in the waters  off other coasts of the two states 
would, pr imfac ie ,  be  applied  to  marine scientific research in 
arctic waters, subject to whatever special standards may be 
necessary for scientific research vessels operating in arctic 
waters. Second, the  development  of  technology for hydrocar- 
bon exploitation in arctic areas is a  problem common to both 
Canada and the United States. Related matters such as the 
environmental effects of exploitation and the relationship of  oil 
drilling structures to potential shipping routes require joint 
attention. At this level cooperation in sharing expertise and 
developing common standards will be essential. Again, how- 
ever, the purpose of such cooperation is to assist each state in 
developing a regime applicable to an  area subject  to  its  own 
jurisdiction. No regime of joint jurisdiction or management 
(except perhaps in respect of overlapping stocks or deposits in 
boundary areas) is necessary. 
Third, the issue arising out of resource exploitation in arctic 
waters  with the most  important implications for arctic marine 
transportation is the removal  of the resource  from the site to 
markets. Assuming  that the debate  over the utility  of pipelines 
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as opposed to shipping will not be resolved against shipping 
completely, one comes back to the central question of the 
development of a regime for management  and control of the 
shipping of these resources. Resource exploitation interests of 
themselves do not dictate any particular type  of  management 
regime for arctic waters. Nevertheless, regardless of the precise 
status of the waters for marine transportation purposes, for 
resource  exploitation  purposes  the  waters  fall  within Canadian 
jurisdiction. 
Environmental Protection 
Environmental protection has been the central concern in 
Canadian  approaches to the uses  of arctic waters. The problem 
of environmental protection can be reduced to a series of 
particular questions: (1) What is it that requires protection? 
Whose  interests are at stake? (2) What activities are likely to 
cause harm? (3) What  standards are necessary to ensure  ade- 
quate protection? (4) Who should set those standards, adminis- 
ter  and  enforce  them? 
The first two  questions relate to research and  inquiry into the 
characteristics of the arctic environment  and  of the activities 
likely to affect that  environment - in other words, the develop- 
ment of an adequate database. On these matters cooperation 
between  Canada  and the U. S.  exists, and  it can be strengthened 
without infringing upon the particular interests of either state. 
The third question, concerned with determining appropriate 
standards, is also a matter that should be resolved through 
cooperation  and  consultation  between  the states involved. 
Standard-setting involves a reconciliation of the interests of 
states wishing to use arctic waters for marine transportation 
purposes  and  Canadian interests in  preserving  the cology of the 
water  and  land  of  the arctic archipelago. Ultimately, however, 
this  is  related  to  the fourth question - who, in the last resort, 
has the authority to set the standards and to administer and 
enforce  them? Obviously  there can be disagreement  over what 
standards are necessary - arising  out of disagreement over the 
likelihood of harm  resulting  from  any particular activity - and, 
therefore, it  becomes a matter  of  importance who finally can 
decide which  standards will be adopted. 
From a Canadian perspective a free and open use regime 
under  which  standards  are established by international agree- 
ment  is  not  adequate for arctic waters. The effect of multilateral 
decision  making in respect of the management of arctic marine 
transportation is to submerge the interests of the single state 
whose  adjacent  land  and  waters are likely to  be affected by that 
transportation  to  the  interests  of  the many. Navigation interests 
will  always override environmental and  other interests. That, in 
the  Canadian view, has  been the defect in the Grotian doctrine of 
freedom  of  the seas, which  the 1982 Convention on the Law  of 
the  Sea  went  some  way  to  remedying - in particular, in relation 
to the Arctic, by Article 234. 
By the same token, a  cooperative management regime that in 
the  absence  of  consensus can  only fall  back on the status  quo has 
similar disadvantages. If the status quo favours transit over 
environmental  interests (as the law  of the sea traditionally has 
done), then again the particular interests of the state whose 
adjacent  waters  and  land are most likely to  be affected by marine 
transit are put in second place. On the other hand,  cooperative 
management  mechanisms  built  upon a  foundation where ulti- 
mately the exercise of jurisdiction is the responsibility of the 
state most  affected offers much  more promise.  This  does not 
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mean  that  environmental  interests  will  always dominate naviga- 
tion  or  transportation interests; the way in which  these interests 
are reconciled  will  depend  upon  the  way  the  regime set up  to 
balance  them  carries  out  its ask. It  is the function of a coopera- 
tive management regime in this context to ensure that all 
interests are  taken  into account, and  not just the interests of the 
state in  which jurisdiction ultimately rests. 
Navigation in Arctic  Waters 
The various  possible  legal  regimes for the control of arctic 
waters  have  been discussed frequently, and it will  suffice  here 
only to outline them. It is, in fact, only the waters of the 
Canadian arctic archipelago that pose difficulty. Beyond the 
archipelago the  normal  regimes  of internal waters, territorial sea 
and exclusive economic  zone  apply (subject to the applicability 
of  Article 234 of  the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention). 
The United States has  maintained in the  past  that  the  waters  of 
the  Northwest  Passage constitute an  international strait, through 
which  innocent  passage  cannot be suspended. Under  this view, 
all ships transitting the Northwest  Passage  are  subject only to the 
law of their flag state, which  would  apply  any internationally 
agreed standards. Canada, by contrast, has  maintained  the right, 
either by historic title or  otherwise, to  treat  the  waters  of the 
Canadian arctic archipelago  as  the internal waters  of Canada. 
Under  such a regime  Canada  would  have  the  right to regulate all 
shipping within those waters, including setting minimum 
requirements for ships seeking  access to  the  waters or prohibit- 
ing  access altogether. Thus, no  right  of  passage  would exist in 
those  waters  unless  authorized by Canada, and  the  waters  would 
not constitute an  international strait. 
An alternative approach to regulating shipping, which put 
aside  but  was  not  intended  to  prejudice Canada’s  claim to  treat 
these waters as internal waters, was adopted in the Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act. There Canada asserted the 
authority to set standards for all shipping, including  standards 
relating to the construction, design, manning  and equipment of 
vessels, in arctic waters. This authority  was  said to derive from 
the special interest and responsibility of the adjacent coastal 
state in  protecting the unique ecology of the arctic environment 
and  was  not  based explicitly on any claim to historic title over 
the waters. This  approach,  although ighly controversial at  the 
time, is  now  embodied  in  Article  234  of  the 1982  Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, which authorizes coastal states to adopt and 
enforce non-discriminatory laws for the prevention,  reduction 
and control of  marine  pollution  in  ice-covered  areas  within  the 
limits of the EEZ ‘‘where  particularly severe climatic conditions 
and  the  presence of ice covering such areas for most  of the year 
create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution  of  the  marine  environment  could cause  major harm  to 
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. ” In 
essence, the  provision  recognizes the predominant interest and 
responsibility of  the  adjacent coastal state and thus allows it to 
enact and enforce laws relating to shipping designed to protect 
the particular marine and land environments of ice-covered 
ocean areas. 
Canada  has  consistently  indicated its opposition to the char- 
acterization of the  Northwest  Passage as an international strait. 
Although it  is difficult to deny that the Passage  is  a strait in 
geographic terms, in  view  of  the fact that the Northwest Passage 
has  not  been  used for international  navigation  in a legal sense, 
the argument that  at  present it constitutes an international strait 
ARCTIC  MARINE  TRANSPORTATION 
has  little  foundation  in law. On  the other  hand, the passage  of 
the arctic waters  legislation  and the negotiation of Article  234  of 
the  1982  Convention  on  the Law  of the Sea  were endeavours to 
try to secure  domestically  and  to obtain international recogni- 
tion for the necessary authority to enable Canada to control 
shipping in arctic waters without unduly interfering with the 
interests of other states. 
The question  must  be asked, therefore, whether  Article  234  is 
an adequate basis for jurisdiction - should it be used as a 
starting point for the construction of a regime for marine 
transportation in arctic waters? Of course, the status of Article 
234 will always remain in doubt until the Law of the Sea 
Convention  comes  into force, and  even  then failure by the U.S. 
to  become a party to that  Convention  would  make Article 234 a 
tenuous basis for the erection of a Canadian jurisdictional 
regime. In  this regard, it is significant that President Reagan’s 
proclamation of a 200-mile EEZ on 10  March 1983 made  no 
reference to any  regime for arctic waters  and thus has left open 
where  the U.S. stands  on the acceptability  or otherwise of the 
Article  234 regime. 
These considerations apart, Article 234 raises problems of 
interpretation that  would  have  to  be  resolved before it could  be 
regarded as a satisfactory  basis for a legal regime.  One would 
wish  to know, for example, whether  Article 234 applies to all 
waters  seaward of the outer limit of the 200-mile EEZ, or only  to 
the waters  of  the EEZ itself (i.e., does it  apply  to the territorial 
sea?) and  whether  Article  234  applies to all of the waters  of the 
Canadian arctic archipelago, thus excluding the regime  of 
international straits from the Northwest Passage (McRae and 
Goundrey, 1982). An interpretation  of Article 234 that  would 
allow the coastal  state  to establish design, construction, man- 
ning  and  equipment  standards  as it deemed appropriate for arctic 
waters  within  200  miles of its coasts would correspond with the 
jurisdiction asserted  by  Canada  in  the  Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act.  The requirement  of  Article  234  that due regard 
must  be  had  to  navigation  poses no real difficulty in  view of 
Canada’s expressed  interest in opening the waters of the North- 
west  Passage to navigation  and  in  view  of the fact that the arctic 
waters legislation, while  proscribing  navigation that could result 
in damage to the environment, does not purport to prohibit 
navigation altogether. On the other hand, a more restrictive 
interpretation of Article  234  would  make it, in Canadian eyes, a 
less effective means for securing Canada’s interests in the 
waters of the arctic archipelago. 
An argument sometimes  invoked  by the United States against 
an assertion of jurisdiction by Canada over the waters of the 
arctic archipelago  is  that it would create a bad precedent that 
might be followed by other states in other areas and under 
different conditions. From a Canadian perspective this argu- 
ment does not go to the merits  of the question of jurisdiction 
over arctic waters  and  hardly appears as a sufficient justification 
for the U.S. position. The intent  of Article 234  was to acknowl- 
edge that  ice-covered  areas are unique, and the separate inclu- 
sion  of  that  provision  in  the 1982 Convention on the Law  of the 
Sea  represented a recognition  by states of  the unique character- 
istics of these waters. The U.S. position might have been a 
reasonable  one during the course of negotiations when the U. S . 
was  seeking  to limit claims  to extensive coastal state jurisdic- 
tion, but the position  appears less defensible now  that negotia- 
tions have concluded  and claims to jurisdiction are crystallized. 
Moreover, the logic of the U.S.  argument would also suggest 
that the United States must disapprove of a  cooperative manage- 
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ment regime based  upon joint jurisdiction over the area, because 
such a regime involves an exercise of authority by a small 
number of states over waters otherwise open to all. This is 
precisely the unfavourable  precedent  perceived  by  the  United 
States. It might be noted, however, that the U.S. action in 
refusing to sign  the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea may 
have the result that the U.S. will have to engage in bilateral 
negotiations  with “straits states” to secure rights  of passage that 
it  could  have  obtained  through the Convention. If the United 
States is prepared  to  negotiate  such special regimes  and  thereby 
recognize the  special  interests of straits states, a “special 
regime” for the waters of the Canadian arctic archipelago 
should  not  be  considered objectionable. 
There is  no doubt that transit interests on their own are best 
served by a regime of free and open passage; under such a 
regime transit interests  are paramount.  When,  however, other 
factors, such as environmental protection, also have to be 
considered, then a system under which authority ultimately 
resides  in the flag state is defective. Cooperative management 
regimes  where jurisdiction is shared can provide a better mecha- 
nism, provided that the interests of the states involved are 
common and relatively equally balanced. From a Canadian 
perspective  this  balance  does  not exist in relation to the waters  of 
the arctic archipelago. Canada and the United States share 
potential transit interests in those waters; they do not share 
environmental interests  to the same degree. On the other  hand,  a 
system of shared management for Canadian and U.S. arctic 
waters  based  upon  recognition  of Canadian  sovereignty  over the 
waters of the arctic archipelago could be the basis for an 
effective cooperative management regime for arctic marine 
transportation. 
A  MANAGEMENT  REGIME 
An effective management  regime for arctic marine transpor- 
tation  could  be  worked out only if the question  of jurisdiction 
over the  waters  of  the  Canadian arctic archipelago is resolved. 
In essence, this  requires the acceptance by the United States of 
Canadian authority to enact and enforce laws designed to 
regulate shipping  in  those  waters  in terms similar to those set out 
in  the Arctic Waters  Pollution  Prevention Act.  This  could be 
done either by an acceptance of Canadian sovereignty  or by 
putting  Canadian sovereignty to one side and acknowledging an 
interpretation of  the  Article  234 regime, under which the 
Northwest  Passage  could  not in law  become  an international 
strait. The adoption by Canada of straight baselines for the 
Canadian arctic archipelago complicates matters, but it does not 
prevent  the  United States from acknowledging the full extent of 
environmental jurisdiction of the coastal state as embodied in 
Article 234. An essential element of this, from a Canadian 
perspective, would  be  recognition  that  the jurisdiction embod- 
ied in the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is fully 
consistent with  Article 234. 
This would  provide  the starting point for the negotiation  of a 
regime for arctic marine transportation. Again, it should be 
emphasized  that the fact that exclusive  Canadian jurisdiction 
existed over all of the waters  of the arctic archipelago would  not 
mean the exclusion  of all vessels from  those waters. There are 
several examples of  waters  subject to exclusive  Canadian juris- 
diction through  which U.S. vessels have been accorded  a right 
of transit. Under the terms  of  the  1846 Treaty of Washington 
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(Article XXVI), Canada  and the United States each grant to the 
other free and  open  passage  through t e waters on its own side of 
the Strait of Juan de  Fuca.  U.S. vessels travel through those 
parts  of  the St. Lawrence  River  that are wholly  within Canadian 
territory by agreement  with Canada.  Thus, rights of  navigation 
through arctic waters could be established by agreement in 
advance  and  not  depend  on  approval  in individual cases or for 
short-term periods. This  would  allay  concerns  that transit may  at 
any time be  arbitrarily denied. 
The conditions under which such transit could be granted 
would  be  subject  to negotiation. Obviously, it would defeat the 
purpose  of  Canada’s  environmental  regulations  if  passage  were 
guaranteed without attaching conditions relating to the stan- 
dards  that  must  be  met  by  vessels  in respect of design, construc- 
tion, manning  and operation. But this, too, should  be submitted 
to a process of negotiation. Moreover,  a transit agreement of 
this  kind would,  presumably, have  to  be  long term and  provide 
mechanisms  to ensure that  changes  in regulations were  made 
after a process  of consultations - perhaps as the result of a 
recommendation  by a joint consultative mechanism. 
Such an approach, therefore, envisages a form  of cooperative 
management under which both countries would cooperate in 
various  phases  of the management process. That  process would 
include the assembly of the relevant data, the determination of 
the appropriate standards and their embodiment in suitable 
legislation or regulations  and  the administration and enforce- 
ment of those regulations. In so far as the regime would be 
designed to  preserve the environment, it will require a  process 
for monitoring environmental impacts. Specific cooperative 
institutions might  be created, such  as joint commissions,  coop- 
erative research programs, regular  meetings of officials at the 
relevant departmental levels and occasional conferences to 
assess progress. Access to any joint intergovernmental body 
should be provided to interested groups, in particular groups 
representing  northern communities. 
There are also a variety of navigation-related matters that 
would have to be dealt with in any management regime for 
marine transportation in arctic waters. These  include the provi- 
sion of assistance to navigation  in  the form of  navigational aids, 
pilotage services, icebreaker support, search and rescue, sal- 
vage facilities and clean-up facilities in the eventuality of 
marine casualties. In  some  of these matters cooperation already 
exists (e.g., Canada-U.S. Joint  Marine  Pollution Contingency 
Plan), and in principle such cooperation can be developed 
through close coordination  at departmental levels and through 
regular  intergovernmental consultations. 
The possible institutional forms for a management regime 
would vary, depending upon  the  areas  of cooperation and  upon 
the extent to which the governments might be prepared to 
delegate authority. The IJC, referred to already, offers a poten- 
tial model, although  it  might be queried whether governments of 
today  would  show  such a willingness to assign decision-making 
powers to quasi-independent bodies. At the very least, how- 
ever, the institutional structure would require a forum for 
scientific collaboration in research, monitoring and evaluation; 
a regular forum for evaluation of standards, the recommenda- 
tion  of  revisions  to existing standards and the formulation of 
new standards; and a mechanism for consultation with inter- 
ested and  affected groups. In addition, there would have to  be a 
body to oversee operational relationships in respect of oil spills 




Canadian  interests  in  relation  to a marine transportation 
regime for arctic waters  flow  more or less directly  from geogra- 
phy, and  because  the  geography  of  the  Canadian  Arctic differs 
from the geography of the .U.S. Arctic, interests inevitably 
differ. The distinguishing  geographic characteristic of the Cana- 
dian Arctic is  the archipelago, with  its  myriad of islands and 
waterways. Marine traffic must take a route between these 
islands, with  the  result  that  the consequences of  marine trans- 
portation will extend to them, to their inhabitants and to the 
marine  and  land environment. 
The particular  interest  and the type of authority  asserted by 
Canada in respect of arctic  waters finds a parallel  in the general 
trend  of  the  new  law  of  the sea. The principle  underlying  the 
extension of  coastal state jurisdiction to a  200-mile  exclusive 
economic zone is that responsibility for managing resources 
flows  from contiguity. It  is  the  proximity of the  waters  of  the 
arctic archipelago to  the islands of the archipelago in combina- 
tion  with  the  specific characteristics of  the arctic environment 
that provides the rationale for Canadian assertions of sover- 
eignty and jurisdiction over the  waters of the Canadian arctic 
archipelago. 
Various regimes can be devised to manage  marine transporta- 
tion in arctic waters, but  each  presupposes a particular view of 
the  legal status of  those waters. Attempts to devise  regimes  that 
ignore the  question  of legal status can succeed  only if a particu- 
lar view of the status of those waters is assumed. Thus, a 
resolution of the  status of the waters  is a precondition  to  the 
development of a successful  management regime. 
Recognition that the waters of the Northwest Passage fall 
within Canadian jurisdiction does not foreclose the develop- 
ment  of  cooperative  regimes  between  Canada  and the United 
States. Rather, it would  provide a starting point for the creation 
of a regime under which passage through the waters of the 
Canadian  Arctic  could  be  guaranteed  to  vessels  of the United 
States in  accordance  with conditions that  would ensure  adequate 
protection  of the arctic  environment  without  undue interference 
with legitimate navigation  needs. A  cooperative  regime under 
these conditions would ensure that all relevant interests are 
taken  into  account in the  setting  of appropriate standards and 
their implementation. Mechanisms for cooperation in the pro- 
cess of transit management  in arctic waters  could involve such 
matters as arctic research, standard setting, aids  and assistance 
to navigation, search and rescue, monitoring environmental 
impacts  and enforcement. 
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